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Abstract
We consider an integro-differential model for evolutionary game theory which describes
the evolution of a population adopting mixed strategies. Using a reformulation based on the
first moments of the solution, we prove some analytical properties of the model and global
estimates. The asymptotic behavior and the stability of solutions in the case of two strategies
is analyzed in details. Numerical schemes for two and three strategies which are able to capture
the correct equilibrium states are also proposed together with several numerical examples.
Key words. Continuous mixed strategies, Replicator dynamics, Evolutionary Game Theory,
Kinetic equations, Numerical methods.
1 Introduction
Evolutionary dynamics is based on the ideas of mathematical game theory. In game theory, a
player’s strategy in a game is a complete plan of action at any stage of the game. A pure strategy
defines a specific move or action that a player will follow in every possible attainable situation in a
game. A player’s strategy set is the set of pure strategies available to that player and defines what
strategies are available to play. A mixed strategy is an assignment of a probability to each pure
strategy. This allows for a player to select a pure strategy with a given distribution of probability.
Since probabilities are continuous, there are infinitely many mixed strategies available to a player,
even if their strategy set is finite. Of course, one can regard a pure strategy as a degenerate case
of a mixed strategy, in which that particular pure strategy is selected with probability 1 and every
other strategy with probability 0.
In any game, an important concept is the payoff that is the number which represents the
motivations of a player. The exact definition of the payoff depends on the case of interest: payoff
may represent profit, utility, or other continuous measures, or may simply rank the desirability of
outcomes. In all cases, the payoffs must reflect the motivations of the players. Following the basic
tenet of Darwinism, we may express the success of a player in a game, that means the player’s
survival, as the difference between the player’s payoff and the average payoff of all players.
Dynamic models for continuous strategy spaces have received considerable attention recently
both in theoretical biology when considering the evolution of species traits [1, 5, 9] and in economy
when predicting rational behavior of individuals whose payoffs are given through game interactions
[3, 6].
In the present paper we analyze a continuous mixed strategies model for population dynamics
based on an integro-differential representation. Analogous models based on the replicator equation
with continuous strategy space were recently investigated in [2, 4, 10, 12, 13]. In contrast with
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finite strategy spaces, where the notion of equilibrium is well understood and studied [11, 15], the
situation of games with infinite strategies is still missing a general theory due to several technical
and conceptual difficulties [12].
The model here considered is characterized by a continuous density function f(t,q) of popula-
tion adopting the q ∈ RN strategy at time t and presents some analogies with classical kinetic or
mean field approaches. In particular we show that the model, which contains a cubic nonlinearity
in f , can be reformulated in terms of the first moments of the solution. Such reformulation is
essential in our analysis and in the derivation of numerical approximations.
For the moment based model we prove global existence of solutions and study the asymptotic
behavior and stability of solutions in the case of two strategies. Two classes of stationary solutions
are found. Continuous stationary solutions are characterized by every density function with a given
mean strategy. If we consider more general solutions, so that the probability distributions are no
more absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, another class of stationary
solutions is given by concentrated Dirac masses. Numerical schemes for the two and three strategy
case which are able to capture the correct equilibrium states are also proposed together with several
numerical examples.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model for N pure
strategies and prove a priori estimates and the global existence of solutions. In Section 3, we put
the emphasis on the model with two pure strategies, which can be reduced to a 1D model, and study
the asymptotic behavior of the solutions and their relation with stationary solutions. Section 4 is
dedicated to the numerical approximation of the 1D model and to numerical tests for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma and for the Hawk or Dove games, with results about the a priori estimate, the asymptotic
behavior of the solutions and the stationary solutions. In Section 5 and 6, we present the 2D model
and the numerical tests for the Rock-Scissors-Paper game. Some final considerations are reported
in the last section.
2 An integro-differential model for continuous mixed strate-
gies
2.1 Setting of the model
First, we introduce an integro-differential model for continuous mixed strategies. We start from
some preliminary concepts and definitions taken from [11]. Assume that we have a game where
there are N pure strategies R1 to RN and that the players can use mixed strategies: these consists
in playing the pure strategies R1 to RN with some probabilities q1 to qN with qi ≥ 0 and
∑
qi = 1.
A strategy corresponds to a point q in the simplex
SN := {q = (q1, . . . , qN ) ∈ RN : qi ≥ 0 and
N∑
i=1
qi = 1}. (1)
The corners of the simplex are the standard unit vectors ei with the i-th component is 1 and all
others are 0 and correspond to the N pure strategies Ri, i = 1, . . . , N .
Let us denote by aij the payoff for a player using the pure strategy Ri against a player using the
pure strategy Rj . The N ×N matrix A = (aij) is said to be the payoff matrix. An Ri-strategist
obtains the expected payoff (Aq∗)i =
∑
j aijq
∗
j against a q∗-strategist, since q∗j is the probability
that he is met with strategy Rj . The payoff for a q-strategist against a q∗-strategist is given by
A(q,q∗) := q · Aq∗ =
N∑
i,j=1
aijqiq
∗
j . (2)
We consider a population of individuals as a player of the game and denote by f(t,q) the
density of population adopting the q strategy at time t; the evolution in time of f , due to the
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dynamics of the game, is driven by
∂tf(t,q) = f(t,q)
(∫
SN
A(q,q∗)f(t,q∗) dq∗ − φ(f)
)
, (3)
where the term ∫
SN
A(q,q∗)f(t,q∗) dq∗ (4)
represents the payoff of the strategy q against all the others strategies, A(q,q∗) being the inter-
acting kernel between the q-strategist and the q∗-strategist. The last term of the equation (7) is
defined by
φ(f) :=
∫
SN
∫
SN
f(t,q)A(q,q∗) f(t,q∗) dq∗ dq (5)
and represents the average payoff of the population.
Since
∑N
i=1 qi = 1, we can reduce the number of variables, considering
qN = 1−
N−1∑
i=1
qi
and obtaining the (N − 1) - dimensional model (3), on the simplex
TN−1 := {p = (p1, p2, . . . , pN−1) ∈ RN−1 | pi ≥ 0 ,
N−1∑
i=1
pi ≤ 1}, (6)
namely
∂tf(t,p) = f(t,p)
(∫
TN−1
A(p,p∗)f(t,p∗) dp∗ − φ(f)
)
, (7)
with A(p,p∗) defined by
A(p,p∗) := p · Ap∗ =
N−1∑
i,j=1
aijpip
∗
j , (8)
and φ defined by
φ(f) :=
∫
TN−1
∫
TN−1
f(t,p)A(p,p∗) f(t,p∗) dp∗ dp. (9)
Remark 1. If we take an initial condition
f(0,p) = f0(p) ≥ 0, (10)
with
∫
TN−1 f0(p)dp = 1, then it is easy to see that f ≥ 0 for all t > 0 and if f0(p¯) = 0 for some p¯,
then f(t, p¯) = 0 for all t > 0. We have also that∫
TN−1
f(t,p)dp = 1, ∀ t > 0. (11)
This follows from the mass conservation, by integrating the equation (7) w.r.t. p and using (9)
and (11)
∂t
∫
TN−1
f(t,p) dp = 0. (12)
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Let us introduce the moments for f :
Mk(f) :=
∫
TN−1
pkf(p) dp =
∫
TN−1
pk11 p
k2
2 . . . p
kN−1
N−1 f(p) dp, (13)
with k := (k1, k2, . . . , kN−1). Using Mk(f), the payoff and the average payoff (9) are expressed
respectively by∫
TN−1
A(p,p∗) f(t,p∗) dp∗ =
N−1∑
j=1
Mej (f)
(
N−1∑
i=1
ϑi,j pi + ςj
)
+ aN,N +
N−1∑
i=1
υi pi, (14)
φ(f) =
N−1∑
j=1
Mej (f)
(
N−1∑
i=1
ϑi,jMei(f) + ςj
)
+ aN,N +
N−1∑
i=1
υiMei(f), (15)
where ei ∈ RN−1 is the standard unit vector with the i-th component equal to 1 and all others
equal to 0, ϑi,j := ai,j − ai,N − aN,j + aN,N , ςj := aN,j − aN,N , υi := ai,N − aN,N .
In the final form of the equation (7), that we will use later in this paper, the only integral terms
are the first moments Mei :
∂tf(t,p) = f(t,p)
N−1∑
i=1
(pi −Mei(f))
υi + N−1∑
j=1
ϑi,jMej (f)
 . (16)
2.2 Global existence of the solutions
We consider the Cauchy problem (16)-(10) for t ≥ 0 and p ∈ TN−1, i.e.
∂tf(t,p) = f(t,p)
(
N−1∑
i=1
(pi −Mei(f))
(
υi +
N−1∑
j=1
ϑi,jMej (f)
))
f(0,p) = f0(p),
(17)
with f0(p) ≥ 0 and
∫
TN−1 f0(p)dp = 1.
Proposition 1 (Local existence). For all M > 0 there exists T (M) > 0 such that if ||f0(p)|| ≤M ,
then there exists a unique solution f ∈ C([0, T˜ ]× TN−1) for the problem (17), for all T˜ ≤ T (M).
Proof. Let us define
T (M) := max
R≥M
min(T1(R,M), T2(R,M)), (18)
where
T1(R,M) :=
R
(R+M)(1 +R+M)(V + Θ(R+M))
,
T2(R,M) :=
1
S(R,M)
,
and
S(R,M) := (1 +R+M)(V + Θ(R+M)) + (R+M)(V + Θ(1 + 2(R+M))) + 2Θ(R+M)2,
V :=
N−1∑
i=1
|υi|, and Θ :=
N−1∑
i=1
N−1∑
j=1
|ϑi,j |. (19)
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We define the set
BR := {g ∈ C([0, T ]× TN−1) | |g − f0|C ≤ R}, (20)
for R ≥M , and, for all g ∈ BR, the operator
G(g)(p) := f0(p) +
∫ t
0
g(p)
(
N−1∑
i=1
(pi −Mei(g))
(
υi +
N−1∑
j=1
ϑi,jMej (g)
))
dt. (21)
We have that for all g ∈ BR,
|Mek(g)| ≤ R+M, ∀ k,
|pk −Mek(g)| ≤ 1 +R+M, ∀ k.
It is easy to prove that G(g) ∈ BR for t ≤ T (M):
|G(g)− f0| ≤
∫ t
0
|g − f0 + f0|
(
N−1∑
i=1
|pi −Mei(g)|
(
|υi|+
N−1∑
j=1
|ϑi,j | |Mej (g)|
))
dt
≤
∫ t
0
(R+M)
(
N−1∑
i=1
(1 +R+M)
(
|υi|+ (R+M)
N−1∑
j=1
|ϑi,j |
))
dt
= t(R+M)(1 +R+M)(V + Θ(R+M)) ≤ R.
The operator G(g) is a contraction on BR for t ≤ T (M): for all g, g˜ ∈ BR
|G(g)−G(g˜)| =
= |
∫ t
0
[
g
(
N−1∑
i=1
(pi −Mei(g))
(
υi +
N−1∑
j=1
ϑi,jMej (g)
))]
dt
−
∫ t
0
[
g˜
(
N−1∑
i=1
(pi −Mei(g˜))
(
υi +
N−1∑
j=1
ϑi,jMej (g˜)
))]
dt|
≤
∫ t
0
|g − g˜|
(
N−1∑
i=1
|pi −Mei(g)|
(
|υi +
N−1∑
j=1
|ϑi,j | |Mej (g)|
))
dt
+
∫ t
0
|g˜|
[(
N−1∑
i=1
|pi −Mei(g)|
(
|υi|+
N−1∑
j=1
|ϑi,j | |Mej (g)|
))]
dt
−
∫ t
0
|g˜|
[(
N−1∑
i=1
|pi −Mei(g˜)|
(
|υi|+
N−1∑
j=1
|ϑi,j | |Mej (g˜)|
))]
dt
=
∫ t
0
|g − g˜|
(
N−1∑
i=1
|pi −Mei(g)|
(
|υi|+
N−1∑
j=1
|ϑi,j | |Mej (g)|
))
dt
+
∫ t
0
|g˜|
(
N−1∑
i=1
|υi||Mei(g)−Mei(g˜)|
)
dt
+
∫ t
0
|g˜|
(
N−1∑
i=1
(
N−1∑
j=1
|ϑi,j | |Mej (g)−Mej (g˜)||pi − (Mei(g) +Mei(g˜))|
))
dt
≤ t S(R,M) sup|g − g˜|.
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The last inequality is obtained using the following inequalities, for all g, g˜ ∈ BR:
|g˜| ≤ R+M,
|Mek(g)−Mek(g˜)| ≤ sup|g − g˜|, ∀ k
|Mek1 (g)Mek2 (g˜)−Mek2 (g)Mek1 (g˜)| ≤ 2(R+M)sup|g − g˜| ∀ k1, k2.
We have that G(g) is a contraction on BR for all t ≤ T (M) and so problem (17) admits a unique
solution f ∈ C([0, T˜ ]× TN−1), for all T˜ ≤ T (M).
We proved the local existence of solution in a time interval (0, T˜ ), depending on M . Now we
define Tmax as the time limit in which this local solution exists.
Lemma 2.1. If Tmax < +∞ then lim supt→T−max ||f ||∞ = +∞.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Let be lim supt→T−max ||f ||∞ = M¯ < ∞. This means that
∀ ε > 0 there exists δε such that ∀ t¯ ∈ (Tmax − δε, Tmax) we have ||f(t¯)||∞ ≤ M¯ + ε. Now we fix
t¯ > Tmax−min(δε, T (M¯+ε)) and consider the problem (17) with initial data (t0, f0(p)) = (t¯, f(t¯)).
Using Lemma 1, we have that there exists a solution f ∈ C([0, t¯+ T (M¯ + ε)]× TN−1) and this is
in contradiction with the definition of Tmax because t¯+ T (M¯ + ε) > Tmax.
Lemma 2.2. The solution f of the Cauchy problem (17) verifies the following a priori estimate
||f(t,p)||L∞ ≤ max
p
(f0(p)) e
Bt, (22)
with B := ∑N−1i=1 (|υi|+∑N−1j=1 |ϑi,j |) .
Proof. Since 0 ≤Mei(f) ≤ 1, for all i
∂tf ≤ f
N−1∑
i=1
|υi|+ N−1∑
j=1
|ϑi,j |
 .
The proof follows easily using the Gronwall inequality.
Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2 provide the following Theorem:
Theorem 2.3 (Global existence). There exists a unique global solution f ∈ C([0,+∞) × TN−1)
to problem (17).
Now we present a simple property of the moments that we will use later in the paper to study
the asymptotic behavior of the solutions for 2× 2 games.
Lemma 2.4. If f ∈ C(TN−1) then 0 < Mk(f) < 1, for all k ∈ RN−1.
Proof. Let S be an open set, such that
S ⊂ TN−1 with f(p) > 0 ∀p ∈ S.
The set S is not empty because f ≥ 0 and its integral over TN−1 is equal to 1. We have f(p) >
pk f(p) > 0 ∀p ∈ S, and so
Mk ≥
∫
S
pkf(p) dp > 0. (23)
We have also that
0 <
∫
S
pk f(p) dp <
∫
S
f(p) dp, (24)
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Since
∫
TN−1\S f(p) dp ≥ 0 and (24) holds, we have
1 =
∫
TN−1
f(p) dp =
∫
TN−1\S
f(p) dp +
∫
S
f(p) dp > Mk(f), ∀k.
3 Two strategies games
Assume there are two different strategies, whose interplay is ruled by the payoff matrix:
A =
(
a b
c d
)
.
In this case the simplex T1 is just the interval [0, 1] and so we have a population where individuals are
going to play the first strategy with probability p ∈ [0, 1] and the second strategy with probability
1− p. The payoff (2) is given by
A(p,p∗) :=
(
p
1− p
)(
a b
c d
)(
p∗
1− p∗
)
= (a+ d− b− c)pp∗ + (b− d)p+ (c− d)p∗ + d
= αpp∗ + βp+ γp∗ + δ,
(25)
with
α := a+ d− b− c, β := b− d, γ := c− d, δ := d. (26)
The one dimensional Cauchy problem (17) reads{
∂tf(p) = f(p) [(αM1(f) + β)(p−M1(f))] t ≥ 0, p ∈ [0, 1],
f(0, p) = f0(p), p ∈ [0, 1],
(27)
with f0(p) ≥ 0 and
∫ 1
0
f0(p)dp = 1.
3.1 Asymptotic behavior of the solutions
We want to understand what happens asymptotically. We start with a result on the curve of
change of sign for ∂t f .
Proposition 2. If f ∈ C([0, 1]) then for all t ≥ 0 there exists p¯ = p¯(t) ∈ (0, 1) such that
M1(f(t)) = p¯(t), namely
∂tf(t, p¯(t)) = 0, (28)
sgn(∂tf(t, p)) = −sgn(αM1(f(t, p)) + β) ∀ p < p¯(t), (29)
sgn(∂tf(t, p)) = sgn(αM1(f(t, p)) + β) ∀ p > p¯(t). (30)
The proof of Proposition 2 is easily obtained by Lemma 2.4.
Let us write the equation for the first moment M1(f):
M ′1(t) = (αM1(f) + β)(M2(f)−M21 (f)). (31)
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The Jensen inequality gets
M21 (f) =
(∫ 1
0
p f dp
)2
≤
∫ 1
0
p2 f dp = M2, (32)
and so
sgn(M ′1(t)) = sgn(αM1(f) + β). (33)
There are four different possible cases:
Case a −β
α
/∈ (0, 1). Figure 1 shows that it is possible if and only if (α, β) ∈ A ∪B.
Let us describe in detail the different situations:
α!
β= -!α!
!
"#
β!
$#
%#
Figure 1: The quantity −β
α
/∈ (0, 1) ⇐⇒ (α, β) ∈ A ∪ B. In A we have β > min(0,−α); in B
we have β < min(0,−α). The quantity −β
α
∈ (0, 1) ⇐⇒ (α, β) ∈ C ∪ D. In C we have α > 0,
−α < β < 0; in D we have α < 0, 0 < β < −α.
(α, β) ∈ A this means that β > min(0,−α). If α ≥ 0 then 0 < β ≤ αM1(f) + β ≤ α + β; if
α < 0 then 0 < α + β ≤ αM1(f) + β ≤ β. In any case we have αM1(f) + β ≥ 0 and
so M ′1(f) = (αM1(f) + β)(M2(f) −M21 (f)) ≥ 0. As shown in Figure 2 (on the left),
M1(f) is increasing in time and is limited on the right by the curve M˜(t) −→ 1 with
M˜ ′(t) = (αM˜ + β)M˜(1− M˜).
(α, β) ∈ B this means that β < min(0,−α). If α ≥ 0 then β ≤ αM1(f) + β ≤ α + β < 0; if
α < 0 then α + β ≤ αM1(f) + β ≤ β < 0. In any case we have αM1(f) + β ≤ 0 and
so M ′1(f) = (αM1(f) + β)(M2(f) −M21 (f)) ≤ 0. As shown in Figure 2 (on the right),
M1(f) is decreasing in time and is limited on the left by the curve M˜(t) −→ 0 with
M˜ ′(t) = (αM˜ + β)M˜(1− M˜).
Case b −β
α
∈ (0, 1). Figure 1 shows that it is possible if and only if (α, β) ∈ C ∪D.
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∂t f < 0
∂t f > 0
M
1
(0) 10
∂t f < 0
∂t f > 0
M
1
(0) 10
Figure 2: On the left: evolution of M1(t) in the case (α, β) ∈ A. On the right: evolution of M1(t)
in the case (α, β) ∈ B.
(α, β) ∈ C Figure 3 (on the left) shows two different situations:
M1(0) > −β
α
=⇒ M ′1(f) > 0;
M1(0) < −β
α
=⇒ M ′1(f) < 0.
By contrast with the previous case, the behavior changes according to the value of the
first moment M1 at initial time t = 0. If M1(0) > −βα then M1(t) increases in time
and is limited on the left by the curve M˜(t) −→ 1 with M˜ ′(t) = (αM˜ + β)M˜(1 − M˜).
Conversely, if M1(0) < −βα then M1(t) decreases in time and is limited on the right by
the curve M˜(t) −→ 0 with M˜ ′(t) = (αM˜ + β)M˜(1− M˜).
(α, β) ∈ D Figure 3 (on the right) shows the two situations:
M1(0) > −β
α
=⇒ M ′1(f) < 0;
M1(0) < −β
α
=⇒ M ′1(f) > 0.
Also in this case, the behavior depends on the value of M1(0): if M1(0) > −βα then
M1(t) decreases in time away from the value −βα ; if M1(0) < −βα then M1(t) increases
in time toward the value −βα . In any cases, the value −βα is the one that dominates in
time.
∂t f < 0
∂t f > 0
∂t f < 0
∂t f > 0
M
1
(0) 10 M1(0)−
β
α
∂t f < 0
∂t f > 0
0
∂t f < 0
∂t f > 0
M
1
(0) 1M1(0)−
β
α
Figure 3: On the left: evolution of M1(t) in the case (α, β) ∈ C. On the right: evolution of M1(t)
in the case (α, β) ∈ D.
From the behavior described is easy to understand what happens in the population. If we are in
region A, there is dominance of the first of the two pure strategies that describe the game, because
the dynamic encourages the state p = 1 which corresponds to the first pure strategy. This means
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that in the population, those who adopt the first pure strategy survive, the others do not. In B
we have the opposite situation: there is the dominance of the second pure strategy and so those
who adopt the first pure strategy or any other mixed strategy, do not survive. The third region
C is such that there is not a mixed strategy that dominates, but a priori we can not say which
of the two pure strategies dominates, it all depends on the value of M1(0). If M1(0) > −βα then
there is the dominance of the first pure strategy, if M1(0) < −βα then there is the dominance of
the second pure strategy. In D we have a different situation than in the previous cases: here there
is coexistence between the two pure strategies and so between the two populations.
3.2 Stationary solutions
From the study of the asymptotic behavior, we expect that for t → ∞ the solution of the model
(27) tends to a stationary solution. We can find two classes of stationary solutions:
Type I If we are in case b, namely −βα ∈ (0, 1), then a stationary solution is given by every
density function f(p) such that
M1(f) = −β
α
. (34)
Type II If we consider more general solutions, so that the probability distributions are no more
absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, we can say that another class
of stationary solutions is given by concentrated Dirac masses, i.e.:
fp(p) = δ(p = p).
In the following we are going to deal with these generalized solutions in a quite informal way.
More rigorous arguments will be given in a future paper.
Here we want just remark that formally, since M1(fp) = p, we have
fp(p) [(αM1(fp) + β)(p−M1(fp))] = δ(p = p)(αp+ β)(p− p) = 0.
3.2.1 Linear stability of stationary solutions
This Subsection is dedicated to the study of the linear stability of stationary solutions. Denote by
Q(f) = f(p) [(αM1(f) + β)(p−M1(f))]
the integral operator associated to the replicator equation. Let f˜ be a generalized stationary state.
We linearise the operator around the state f˜ . So for every perturbation g, with
∫ 1
0
g(p)dp = 0, we
have the linear operator
Q′(f˜)(g) = limh→0 1h
(
Q(f˜ + hg)−Q(f˜)
)
=
[
f˜M1(g) + g(αM1(f˜) + β)
]
(p−M1(f˜)).
Type I we have −1 < β
α
< 0. Using (34) we obtain that the linearized equation for a perturbation
g is given by
∂tg(p) = Q
′(f)(g) = f(p)(p−M1(f))M1(g). (35)
If
∫ 1
0
g0(p)dp = 0, the same is true for g for t > 0.
Proposition 3. Assume −β
α
∈ (0, 1). Then, there is no continuous stationary solution f¯(p)
to problem (27) which is linearly stable.
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Proof. To prove the result it is enough to establish the following equality
M2(f¯) = (M1(f¯))
2, (36)
which implies that the variance of the measure f¯dp vanishes and so the measure has to be a
Dirac mass. We take a continuous stationary solution of Type I, namely a positive function
f such that its total mass is equal to 1 andM1(f) = −βα . We perturb this state by a function
g of zero mass. Computing the first moment of the perturbation g yields
M ′1(g) = M1(g)(M2(f)− (M1(f))2).
Setting
N1(f¯) := M2(f)− (M1(f))2 =
∫ 1
0
p(p+
β
α
)f(p)dp,
we obtain:
M1(t, g) = M1(0, g)e
tN1 .
Moreover, setting Nk(f) := Mk+1(f)−Mk(f)M1(f), we have
Mk(t, g) = Mk(0, g) +
Nk(f)M1(0, g)
N1(f¯)
(etN1(f¯) − 1).
This means that the condition for linear stability is just:
N1(f) =
∫ 1
0
p(p+
β
α
)f(p)dp ≤ 0.
This inequality can be verified only when the equality condition is satisfied, since we already
know from (32) that N1(f¯) ≥ 0.
Type II For the concentrated Dirac masses fp(p) = δ(p = p) we have that the linearized equation
for a perturbation g is given by
∂tg(p) = Q
′(fp)(g) = g(p)(αp+ β)(p− p). (37)
Proposition 4. The Dirac mass solutions are linear stable if, on the support of g(p), we
have:
(αp+ β)(p− p) ≤ 0, ∀ p ∈ [0, 1].
For general perturbations, i.e.: with supp g ≡ [0, 1] we have three cases:
1. the Dirac mass concentrated in p = 0 is stable if β < 0, which means in the original
constants, b < d.
2. the Dirac mass concentrated in p = 1 is stable if α+β > 0, which means in the original
constants, a > c.
3. if −1 < βα < 0, then the Dirac mass concentrated in p = −βα is stable.
4 Numerical approximation of the 1D model
We want to perform some numerical simulations with model (27). We consider some nodes
pi ∈ [0, 1] i = 0, . . . , I, (p0 = 0, pI = 1),
and, using the trapezoidal rule, we obtain the following quadrature formula for the first moment
M1(f) (for all times t ∈ [0, T ])
M1(f) =
∫ 1
0
pf(t, p)dp ≈ M˜1(f) :=
I−1∑
i=0
pi+1 − pi
2
[pi+1f(t, pi+1) + pif(t, pi)] . (38)
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Clearly the above discretization is such that conservation of mass holds
d
dt
I−1∑
i=0
pi+1 − pi
2
[f(t, pi+1) + f(t, pi)] =
(αM˜1(f) + β)
I−1∑
i=0
pi+1 − pi
2
[
(pi+1 − M˜1(f))f(t, pi+1) + (pi − M˜1(f))f(t, pi)
]
= 0,
provided that initially
I−1∑
i=0
pi+1 − pi
2
[f0(pi+1) + f0(pi)] = 1.
In the case of equally spaced points, ∆p = pi+1 − pi, the above property implies that
f(t, pi) ≤ 1
∆p
, ∀ t > 0, i = 0, . . . , I,
and thus the numerical solution is well-defined even when we approach a Dirac delta at the con-
tinuous level. More precisely both possible steady states are preserved by the numerical method,
namely M˜1(f¯) = −β/α and the discrete Dirac delta defined as
fp¯i(pj) =

0, i 6= j
1
∆p
, i = j, i = 1, . . . , I − 1
2
∆p
, i = j, i = 0, I.
For the time discretization we simply use a fourth order Runge-Kutta method with constant time
stepping ∆t on the interval [0, T ]. Nonnegativity of the numerical solution is achieved taking
∆t ≤ |αM˜1(fn) + β|−1,
where fn(pi) = f(tn, pi), tn = n∆t.
4.1 Numerical tests: Prisoner’s Dilemma game
One interesting example of a game is given by the so-called Prisoner’s dilemma game in which there
are two players and two possible strategies. The players have two options, cooperate or defect.
The payoff matrix is the following
C D
A =
(
R S
T P
)
.
C
D
If both players cooperate both obtain R fitness units (reward payoff); if both defect, each receives
P (punishment payoff); if one player cooperates and the other defects, the cooperator gets S
(sucker’s payoff) while the defector gets T (temptation payoff). The payoff values are ranked
T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S. From the game theory we know that cooperators are always
dominated by defectors. One of the main problems has been about the possibility of success for
cooperation, which is impossible in the pure strategies models: the replicator dynamics of prisoner’s
dilemma, [11], shows that cooperators are extinguished.
For the numerical tests we fix the following normalized payoff matrix:
A =
(
1 0
b ε
)
, (39)
with b = 1.1 and ε = 0.001. In this case we have α = 1− b+ ε < 0 and β = −ε < 0 and so βα > 0.
This means that stationary solutions are expected to be given by concentrated Dirac masses (see
Section 3.2). For general perturbation we have that p¯ = 0 is linearly stable.
12
4.1.1 Test n.1
We consider the initial datum
f0(p) = 1 ∀ p ∈ [0, 1]. (40)
Figure 4 shows that the density f tends to concentrate at the point p = 0, according to what we
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Evolution of the density f for the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
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Figure 4: Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, test n.1: b = 1.1, ε = 0.001. Plot of the evolution over time
of f(t, p) for the Cauchy problem (27) with f0(p) = 1 for T = 1000.
expected.
We have studied, numerically, the L∞-norm of the solution f . Using the a priori estimate (22), we
know that
||f ||∞ ≤ ||f0(p)||∞e(|α|+|β|)t = e(|α|+|β|)t,
and this yields
H(t) := Log(||f ||∞) ≤ (|α|+ |β|)eLog(t) =: E(t), ∀ t. (41)
Figure 5 shows that inequality (41) is respected. In the prisoner’s dilemma game we have that
 2  1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Evolution of the L infinity norm of the density f
Log(t)
 
 
H(t)
E(t)
Figure 5: Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, test n.1: we have Log(t) on the x-axes and H(t) and E(t) on
the y-axes for the Cauchy problem (27) with f0(p) = 1 for T = 1000.
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Figure 6: Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, test n.1: b = 1.1, ε = 0.001. Plot of the evolution of M1(t)
vs. time t for the Cauchy problem (27) with f0(p) = 1 for T = 1500.
(α, β) ∈ B (see Figure 1) and we know, from game theory, that the defectors’ pure strategy dom-
inates the cooperators’ pure strategy. The evolution in time of M1(f) (Figure 6) is as expected
(see Figure 2 (on the right)).
We consider now a quadratic initial datum for the model (27). We have plotted the numerical
results in Figure 7. As in the previous case with f0(p) = 1, we see that the density f tends to
concentrated at the point p = 0 that corresponds to the defectors’ strategy.
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Figure 7: Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, test n.1: b = 1.1, ε = 0.001. Plot of the evolution over
time of f(t, p) for the Cauchy problem related to the model (27) with initial datum f0(p) =
−p2 + 23p+ 1 ∀ p ∈ [0, 1] for T = 1000.
4.1.2 Test n.2
Now we want to consider an initial datum f0(p) with compact support in [p1, p2] ⊂ [0, 1], with
p1 < p2. If we define
q :=
p− p1
p2 − p1 (42)
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we have that f0(q) has compact support in [0, 1]. W.r.t. q the average payoff (25) has the following
form
A(q, q∗) = α¯qq∗ + β¯q + γ¯q∗ + δ¯, (43)
with
α¯ := α(p2 − p1)2, β¯ := α(p2 − p1)p1 + β(p2 − p1), (44)
γ¯ := α(p2 − p1)p1 + γ(p2 − p1), δ¯ := αp21 + (γ − β − 2δ)p1 + δ. (45)
The quantity
β¯
α¯
=
1
p2 − p1
(
p1 +
β
α
)
is positive if βα > 0, as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This means that the point p¯ = p1
(corresponding to the point q¯ = 0) is stable, as shown in Figure 8 that is related to the Cauchy
problem (27) with the following initial datum:
f0(p) =
{
2 p ∈ [ 14 , 12] ∪ [ 34 , 1]
0 elsewhere.
(46)
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Figure 8: Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, test n.2: b = 1.1, ε = 0.001. Plot of the evolution over time
of f(t, p) for the Cauchy problem (27) with initial datum (46) for T = 1000.
4.2 Numerical tests: Hawk or Dove Game
Another example of a game is given by the so-called Hawk or Dove game in which there are two
pure strategies: hawks (H) and doves (D). While hawks escalate fights, doves retreat when the
opponent escalates. The benefit of winning the fight is b. The cost of injury is c. If two hawks
meet, then the expected payoff for each of them is b−c2 . The fight will escalate. One hawk wins,
while the other is injured. Since both hawks are equally strong, the probability of winning or losing
is 12 . If a hawk meets a dove, the hawk wins and receives payoff b, while the dove retreats and
receives payoff 0. If two doves meet, there will be no injury. One of them eventually wins. The
expected payoff is b2 . Thus the payoff matrix is given by
H D
A =
 b− c2 b
0
b
2
 . H
D
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If b < c, then neither pure strategy is a Nash equilibrium. If everybody adopts the first pure
strategy (H), it is best to adopt the second pure strategy (D) and vice versa. This means that
hawks and doves can coexist. Selection dynamics will lead to a mixed population.
We fix b = 1 and look for a suitable value of c > b for the numerical tests. We obtain the
matrix
A =
 1− c2 1
0
1
2
 .
In this case we have −β
α
=
1
c
and (α, β) ∈ D if c > 1 (see Figure 1). The function
f0(p) = −p2 + θp+ 1 (47)
is an admissible stationary solution for the problem, namely positive, with a total mass equal to 1,
and with the first momentum equal to −β
α
, if and only if θ = 23 and c =
36
17 . In Figure 9 we show
the numerical results for the Cauchy problem (27), associated to this initial datum. We remark
that the numerical scheme preserves the stationary solution.
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Figure 9: Hawk or Dove Game, quadratic stationary solution: we plot the evolution over time of
f(t, p) for the Cauchy problem (27) with initial datum (47) for T = 1000.
As a consequence of Proposition 3, the stationary solution (47) is not linearly stable, in fact
M2(f0(p))− (M1(f0(p)))2 =
∫ 1
0
((
−p3 + 2
3
p2 + p
)(
p− 17
36
))
dp ∼= 0.07.
Actually, even small perturbations of the datum can generate large perturbations on the solutions.
We consider a perturbation with zero mass for the function (47):
f˜0(p) = −p2 + 2
3
p+ 1 + 0.02 sin(2pip), (48)
∀ p ∈ [0, 1]. Figure 10 shows the evolution of f(t, p) for the related Cauchy problem. The perturbed
datum (48) originates the loss of the stationary solution, as seen in Figure 10. The solution of
the problem evolves (slowly) towards a Dirac mass and we can see the first moment M1 which
converges to the value −βα = 0.4722 (Figure 11), as expected since (α, β) are in the region D.
16
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Figure 10: Hawk or Dove Game, no stability of quadratic stationary solution: we plot the evolution
over time of f(t, p) for the Cauchy problem (27) with initial datum (48) for T = 1000.
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Figure 11: Hawk or Dove Game, asymptotic behavior: we have t on the y-axes and M1(t) on the
x-axes for the Cauchy problem (27) with initial datum (48) for T = 1000.
17
5 Three strategies games
Assume there are three different strategies, whose interplay is ruled by the payoff matrix:
A =
a1 a2 a3a4 a5 a6
a7 a8 a9
 .
We have a population where individuals are going to play strategy A with probability p1,
strategy B with probability p2 and strategy C with probability 1− p1− p2, for (p1, p2) ∈ T2, where
the simplex T2 is just
T2 = {p = (p1, p2) ∈ R2 | p1, p2 ≥ 0, p1 + p2 ≤ 1}. (49)
The payoff (2) is given by
A(p,p∗) =
 p1p2
1− p1 − p2
a1 a2 a3a4 a5 a6
a7 a8 a9
 p∗1p∗2
1− p∗1 − p∗2

= (a1 − a3 − a7 + a9)p1p∗1 + (a2 − a3 − a8 + a9)p1p∗2
+(a4 − a6 − a7 + a9)p∗1p2 + (a5 − a6 − a8 + a9)p2p∗2 + (a3 − a9)p1
+(a7 − a9)p∗1 + (a6 − a9)p2 + (a8 − a9)p∗2 + a9
= αp1p
∗
1 + βp1p
∗
2 + γp
∗
1p2 + δp2p
∗
2 + σp1 + ηp
∗
1 + ξp2 + µp
∗
2 + ι,
(50)
with α := a1 − a3 − a7 + a9, β := a2 − a3 − a8 + a9, γ := a4 − a6 − a7 + a9, δ := a5 − a6 − a8 + a9,
σ := a3 − a9, η := a7 − a9, ξ := a6 − a9, µ := a8 − a9 and ι := a9. In this case, the problem (17) is{
∂tf(p) = F (f) t ≥ 0, p ∈ T2,
f(0,p) = f0(p),
(51)
where the source term F (f) is defined as follows:
F (f) := f(p)[(αM(1,0)(f) + βM(0,1)(f) + σ)(p1 −M(1,0)(f)) (52)
+ (γM(1,0)(f) + δM(0,1)(f) + ξ)(p2 −M(0,1)(f))].
We consider the initial datum f0(p) such that f0(p) ≥ 0 and
∫
T2 f0(p)dp = 1.
Remark 2. It is easy to prove that if
β ξ − σ δ
δ α− γ β > 0 and
σ γ − ξ α
δ α− γ β > 0, (53)
then every distribution function f¯(p) with
M(1,0) =
β ξ − σ δ
δ α− γ β and M(0,1) =
σ γ − ξ α
δ α− γ β
is a stationary solution for the problem (51). Actually, by arguing as in Section 3, also Dirac
masses concentrated on points are stationary solutions of these equations.
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5.1 A special case: the Rock-Scissors-Paper Game
We consider the Rock-Scissors-Paper game, which is characterized by having three pure strategies
such that R1 is beaten by R2, which is beaten by R3, which is beaten by R1. The outcomes of the
game are tabulated as
A =
 0 1 −1−1 0 1
1 −1 0
 . (54)
In the Rock-Scissors-Paper game, the constants that appear in the source term (52) have the
following values: α = 0, β = 3, σ = −1, γ = −3, δ = 0, ξ = 1, and so
β ξ − σ δ
δ α− γ β =
σ γ − ξ α
δ α− γ β =
1
3
.
The initial datum f0(p) = 2 has integral over T2 equal to 1 and the moments M(1,0)(2) =
M(0,1)(2) =
1
3
and so it is a stationary solution for this game. In the next Section 6 we will
present the numerical results related to this stationary solution.
Now we want to present a result about the curve of changing sign for ∂tf : for this game the
source term (52) is
F (f) = f [(3M(0,1)(f)− 1)p1 + (1− 3M(1,0)(f))p2 +M(1,0)(f)−M(0,1)(f)],
and so we have that the curve p¯(t) ⊂ R2 such that ∂tf(p¯(t)) = 0, is given by
p1(3M(0,1) − 1) + p2(1− 3M(1,0)) +M(1,0) −M(0,1) = 0, ∀ (M(1,0),M(0,1)) ∈ T2, (55)
that is the straight line joining the points (M(1,0)(f),M(0,1)(f)) and
(
1
3
,
1
3
)
. In the following
Section 6 we will present the evolution over time of this straight line.
6 Numerical approximation for the 3-strategies model
First we want to construct a numerical method for problem (51). The domain T2 is just the
triangle with vertices (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1). In order to make the numerical integrations, we fix a
discretization step ∆p and a uniform triangular grid in T2 as Figure 12 shows. Each point of the
grid is
pij := (p1,i, p2,j) i = 0, . . . I, j = 0, . . . , I − i, (56)
with I :=
1
∆p
. We use the notation gi,j := g(t, p1,i, p2,j) for all i = 0, . . . , I and j = 0, . . . , I − i
to indicate the value of a general function g(t, p1, p2) at each grid point pij . In order to discretize
the integral of g over the domain T2, we start to consider each triangle of the grid and indicate its
vertices as (xs, ys), for s = 1, 2, 3. We define the following quantities:
g := max(g(xs, ys)) s = 1, 2, 3 (57)
g := min(g(xs, ys)) s = 1, 2, 3, (58)
the maximum and the minimum value of g on the triangle. On each triangle of the grid we consider
a 2D product formula based on the trapezoidal rule:∫
T2 g(t, p1, p2)dp =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1−p1
0
g(t, p1, p2) dp2 dp1
≈ ∆p
2
2
I−1∑
i=0
I−i∑
j=0
(
g
1
+
1
3
(g1 − g1)
)
+
I−1∑
i=1
I−i∑
j=0
(
g
2
+
1
3
(g2 − g2)
) , (59)
19
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
p1
p2
Triangular grid for the domain T2
pij = (p1i,p2j)
Figure 12: An example of triangular grid for the domain T2.
where
g1 = max(gi,j , gi,j+1, gi+1,j), g1 = min(gi,j , gi,j+1, gi+1,j), (60)
g2 = max(gi,j , gi,j+1, gi−1,j+1), g2 = min(gi,j , gi,j+1, gi−1,j+1). (61)
The discretization of the first moments M(1,0) and M(0,1) is easily obtained by (59), considering
the function g(t, p1, p2) = p1 f(t, p1, p2) for M(1,0)(f) and g(t, p1, p2) = p2 f(t, p1, p2) for M(0,1)(f).
Similarly to the one-dimensional case it can be shown that the method preserves the total mass
in time, as well as discrete analogous of the steady states. As before the time discretization is done
with a fourth order Runge-Kutta method with constant time stepping.
6.1 Numerical tests: The Rock-Scissors-Paper Game
We consider the Cauchy problem associated to the problem (51) for the Rock-Scissors-Paper game
with the payoff matrix (54). The problem has the following equation:
∂tf(p) = f(p)[(3M(0,1)(f)− 1)(p1 −M(1,0)(f))
+(1− 3M(1,0)(f))(p2 −M(0,1)(f))],
f(0,p) = f0(p).
(62)
6.1.1 Test n.1
We start with an initial datum compactly supported in T2: the sum of s ≥ 1 truncated Gaussian
functions, centered in (p0,r1 , p
0,r
2 ) for r = 1, . . . , s. To ensure that (11) applies, we normalize the
datum so that its integral over T2 is equal to 1. Our datum is of the following type
f0(p) :=
G(p)∫
T2 G(p) dp
, (63)
where
G(p) :=
s∑
r=1
max
(
1
2pi
e−Kr[(p1−p
0,r
1 )
2+(p2−p0,r2 )2] − 0.01, 0
)
, (64)
with Kr > 0.
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Figure 13: Rock-Scissors-Paper Game, test 1.1: the evolution of the density f that is the numerical
solution of the Cauchy problem (62)-(63) with s = 2, (p0,11 , p
0,1
2 ) = (
1
10 ,
3
5 ), (p
0,2
1 , p
0,2
2 ) = (
3
5 ,
2
10 ),
K1 = 300, K2 = 190 and T = 20.
Test 1.1
We fix s = 2, (p0,11 , p
0,1
2 ) = (
1
10 ,
3
5 ), (p
0,2
1 , p
0,2
2 ) = (
3
5 ,
2
10 ), K1 = 300, K2 = 190.
The graphical results (in Figure 13) shows that there is dominance of one of the groups: the
initial datum is likely to have two areas of concentration, the final configuration shows only one
area of concentration, and the total L1 mass remains constantly equal to 1 over time. The dom-
inance group is contained in the region where ∂tf is positive as we can see in the Figure 14 that
shows the contours of f and the numerical results of the straight line p¯(t) of changing sign for ∂tf
(see Subsection 5.1). We also remark that, for all t > 0, the support of f(t) is equal or a subset of
the support of the initial datum f0:
supp(f(t)) ⊆ supp(f0), ∀ t > 0.
Test 1.2
We fix s = 2, (p0,11 , p
0,1
2 ) = (
1
3 ,
1
3 ), (p
0,2
1 , p
0,2
2 ) = (
3
16 ,
3
16 ), K1 = 600, K2 = 300.
The graphical results (Figure 15 and Figure 16) show that the situation is different from the
previous test: in this case the initial datum lies between the two regions where ∂tf is positive
and negative and the straight line p¯(t) of separation between this two regions does not changes
significantly over time. Therefore the configuration of the function f at the final time T is not
very different from that at the initial time.
6.1.2 Test 1.3
We fix s = 3, (p0,11 , p
0,1
2 ) = (
1
3 ,
1
3 ), (p
0,2
1 , p
0,2
2 ) = (
3
16 ,
3
16 ), (p
0,3
1 , p
0,3
2 ) = (
1
10 ,
3
5 ), K1 = 600, K2 = 300
and K3 = 300.
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Figure 14: Rock-Scissors-Paper Game, test 1.1: the evolution over time of the contours of the
density f and of the curve p¯(t) of change of sign for ∂t f for the Cauchy problem (62)-(63) with
the same data and the same parameters as the previous Figure 13.
The graphical results (Figure 17 and Figure 18) show dominance phenomena in the region where
∂tf is positive. Initially the three areas of concentration are located, almost entirely, in the region
where ∂tf is negative. The time evolution shows us that, already at t = 6, two of the three areas of
concentration are in the middle between the two regions where ∂tf is negative and positive, then
to the final time, are completely in the region where ∂tf is positive. So it is clear that dominance
takes place in these areas.
7 Conclusions
We have considered a kinetic-like model for the evolution of a continuous mixed strategy game.
The model is based on the time evolution of a density function describing the density of population
adopting a given strategy. We established several analytical properties and develop some numerical
discretizations useful for numerical simulations in the case of two and three strategies. Several
explicit examples for two and three strategies games are reported. Of course when considering
more strategies a deterministic approach may result in excessive computational requirements and
stochastic simulations methods should be considered [7].
Let us finally mention that, in the situation considered so far, each player adopts a strategy
and evolution over time leading to survival or not of the player. In principle it can be interesting
to consider a situation in which each player can change strategy by a random mutation, so moving
through the strategy space. One can introduce, to this end, a term in the equation that allows
for the random change of strategy, following the ideas presented in [8]. The most natural way to
model this phenomenon is to add a variation term in the equation (16), due to the probability
p ∈ TN−1
∂tf −D4pf = f
N−1∑
i=1
(pi −Mei(f))
υi + N−1∑
j=1
ϑi,jMej (f)
 , (65)
with D > 0. The new term 4pf can be interpreted as a diffusion term describing the spreading
of the population in the probability space from strategy to strategy, which in evolution models
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Figure 15: Rock-Scissors-Paper Game, test 1.2: the evolution of the density f that is the numerical
solution of the Cauchy problem (62)-(63) with s = 2, (p0,11 , p
0,1
2 ) = (
1
3 ,
1
3 ), (p
0,2
1 , p
0,2
2 ) = (
3
16 ,
3
16 ),
K1 = 600, K2 = 300 and T = 20.
corresponds to a random mutation mechanism, and will be the object of a future work. A similar
model has been presented recently in [14].
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Figure 17: Rock-Scissors-Paper Game, test 1.3: the evolution of the density f that is the numerical
solution of the Cauchy problem (62)-(63) with s = 3, (p0,11 , p
0,1
2 ) = (
1
3 ,
1
3 ), (p
0,2
1 , p
0,2
2 ) = (
3
16 ,
3
16 ),
(p0,31 , p
0,3
2 ) = (
1
10 ,
3
5 ), K1 = 600, K2 = 300, K3 = 300 and T = 20.
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Figure 18: Rock-Scissors-Paper Game, test 1.3: the evolution over time of the contours of the
density f and of the curve p¯(t) of change of sign for ∂t f for the Cauchy problem (62)-(63) with
the same data and the same parameters as the previous Figure 17.
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